Case Summary

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

Tort; Negligence; duty of care; manufacturer's duty to consumer; product liability.

Facts: Donoghue went to a cafe in Paisley with a friend. The friend bought a bottle of ginger beer and an ice cream for Donoghue. Donoghue poured some of the ginger beer over the ice cream and ate it. Then she poured the rest of the ginger beer into a glass. Donoghue then noticed that the drink contained the remains of a decomposed snail. She claimed that she suffered severe shock and become ill with gastroenteritis as a result. Donoghue, who had not purchased the ginger beer herself, had no contract with the cafe owner or the manufacturer. She therefore sued Stevenson, the manufacturer of the ginger beer, for damages in Negligence on the basis that he had supplied contaminated food that had caused harm to her as the consumer of that food.

Issue: In the circumstances, did Stevenson owe Donoghue a duty of care?

Decision: The House of Lords held that Stevenson owed Donoghue a duty of care.

Reason: Lord Atkin said (at 599):

"[A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care."

Lord Atkin (at 579 - 80) described the traditional approach of identifying 'duty situations':

"The Courts are concerned with the particular relations which come before them in actual litigation, and it is sufficient to say whether the duty exists in those circumstances. The result is that the Courts have been engaged upon an elaborate classification of duties as they exist... In this way it can be ascertained at any time whether the law recognises a duty, but only where the case can be referred to some particular species which has been examined and classified." This reflects the current approach of Australian courts.

In seeking a more general principle for establishing a duty of care, Lord Atkin said (at 580):

"[T]he duty which is common to all the cases where liability is established must logically be based upon some element common to the cases where it is found to exist. To seek a complete logical definition of the general principle is probably to go beyond the function of the judge... At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of 'culpa', is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay."

Note: The approach now taken by Australian courts takes account both of recognised duty situations and more generalised principles. In general, liability for Negligence only arises where the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant fits within a recognised 'duty of care' category. However, in rare cases it may be possible for a duty of care to arise even outside these recognised categories, and this is when Lord Atkin's more general principle helps the court to decide whether liability should be recognised or not.